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for the associative account, are necessarily relevant to the develop-
ment of mirror mechanisms. This evidence is questionable
because the training studies involve behavioral assessments
which are inferred to reflect mirror mechanisms, but there is no
direct evidence that the underlying mirror mechanisms are modi-
fied nor is there evidence that these observed short-term changes
can translate into more permanent long-term effects. Also, at the
neural level, there are two types of experiential learning (Green-
ough et al. 1987). One type is limited to sensitive periods during
early development and is characterized by an overproduction of
new synapses in anticipation of specific experiences that will con-
tribute to the development of species typical behaviors, such as
locomotion and language development (Bertenthal & Campos
1987). By contrast, experience-dependent processes are associ-
ated with the formation of new synapses that develop in response
to unique experiences of the individual organism throughout
development. If Cook et al. are correct that mirror mechanisms
are exclusively a function of an inductive process involving sensor-
imotor learning, their development would correspond to an
experience-dependent process. Currently, this claim is not defen-
sible given that it is just as likely that the early behaviors associated
with mirror mechanisms, such as imitation, are species-typical
behaviors, and thus just as likely to be mediated by an experi-
ence-expectant process which predisposes infants to develop
mirror mechanisms.
In conclusion, the target article raises legitimate reasons to
question an extreme nativist position regarding the development
of mirror mechanisms, but errs in the opposite direction by claim-
ing a strong empiricist position. If a more probabilistic than pre-
determined view of epigenesis is considered (Gottlieb 2007), it
is difficult to imagine how a genetic predisposition could not con-
tribute to the development of mirror mechanisms.
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Abstract: Existing computational models of the mirror system
demonstrate the additional circuitry needed for mirror neurons to
display the range of properties that they exhibit. Such models emphasize
the need for existing connectivity to form visuomotor associations,
processing to reduce the space of possible inputs, and demonstrate the
role neurons with mirror properties might play in monitoring one’s own
actions.
The primary hypothesis set forth by Cook et al. is that mirror
neurons (MNs) are the result of generic associative learning pro-
cesses, rather than the result of evolutionary selection for action
understanding. They claim that the standard view of mirror
neurons, what they call the “genetic account,” suggests that the
predisposition to develop MNs is heritable and was selected for
on the basis of their role in action understanding. However, in
their characterization of the genetic account, Cook et al. do
allow for the role of experience in shaping MNs. Computational
models that simulate the development of MNs through experi-
ence show that this is possible through associative learning mech-
anisms, but that the connectivity to form these associations must
already be in place and that this connectivity must be somewhat
specialized for control of hand actions.
Cook et al. describe the “exaptation hypothesis” as claiming that
MNs require a special kind of sensorimotor learning. However, a
closer look at several of the computational models developed
under this hypothesis, such as the Mirror Neuron System
(MNS) model (Oztop & Arbib 2002), reveals that they do in
fact use standard learning algorithms completely compatible
with the associative learning account. What makes these models
work is the structure of their input representations and their con-
nectivity. The pure associative learning account seems to assume
that every neuron is either directly or indirectly connected with
every other neuron in the brain. Such architecture would
require significantly more trials of action and observation in
order to correctly associate visual stimuli with the relevant
motor representations.
The simplest version of the genetic account would predict that
MNs would be found in different areas of the brain, depending on
the unique history of each individual. This is not the case, at least
in monkeys, and this seems to be due to a genetic influence on the
patterns of connectivity expressed by each brain region. Indeed, as
Cook et al. claim, there is a “wealth of the stimulus” – so much that
the space of possible hand–object interaction representations in
the visual and motor domains makes the associative learning
account computationally intractable. What makes the “exaptation
hypothesis”models able to handle such a space is the fact that the
inputs are constrained to represent the hand–object relationships
appropriate for performing manual actions. This is thought to
occur throughout motor development as the infant learns to
extract the relevant features from visual stimuli for controlling
the hand relative to the object (Oztop et al. 2004). Once the
inputs are restricted to those necessary to control transitive
actions, “domain-general learning processes” can proceed to
associate the visual representation with the motor program at
various levels of abstraction.
Although the learning algorithm in the MNSmodel was compa-
tible with the associative learning account, the network required
extensive pre-processing of its input. Mirror neurons respond to
observation of dynamic hand actions and therefore must process
trajectories in the space of hand–object relationships. Mirror
neurons will often respond to observation of a grasp before the
hand contacts the object. In order to predict the outcome of a
grasp before its completion, the MNS model transformed a tem-
poral sequence of hand–object relations into a spatial pattern of
neural activity for input to the network. A subsequent version of
the MNS model, MNS2, discarded this preprocessing step by
using a recurrent neural network and a modified learning algor-
ithm to handle raw input sequences (Bonaiuto et al. 2007).
These models show that although MNs may acquire their proper-
ties through associative-style learning processes, extra circuitry is
required to perform the computations necessary for processing
dynamic visual input from objected-directed hand actions.
The MNS2 model additionally proposed that audiovisual MNs
develop their auditory properties through simple associative learn-
ing. However, in this model, extra mechanisms such as working
memory and dynamic remapping were required to handle the
case where MNs correctly predict the outcome of a grasp when
the final portion was obscured. It is not clear how these functions
could be developed through pure associative learning.
Giese and Poggio (2003) present a model of visual tuning in the
mirror system that is the most compatible with the associative
learning account. This model currently does not include a learning
mechanism, but it does address the existence of view-dependent
and -independent mirror neurons and does not require recon-
struction of the arm and hand shape. However, it still requires
extensive processing to transform visual input into a reduced
space such that it can be associated with motor signals.
The Augmented Competitive Queuing (ACQ) model embeds a
network such as those in the MNS and MNS2 models in a larger
network that learns self-actions (Bonaiuto & Arbib 2010). In this
model, MN activity signals recognition of successful completion of
one’s own actions. Their output is used as an eligibility trace in
reinforcement learning algorithms that modify the recognized
action’s desirability – how likely an action is to lead to a reward;
and executability – how likely an action can be successfully
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performed in the current context regardless of reward. This model
shows how mirror systems can have evolved for the purposes of
monitoring one’s own actions and fit within a reinforcement learn-
ing framework for action selection.
A mechanistic model of MNs with random or full connectivity
and pure associative learning has never been developed. Current
computational models suggest that appropriate coarse-grained
connectivity and input representations are required to make the
space of possible hand–object relation trajectories tractable.
While the associative learning account is compatible with these
models at a first approximation, it does not offer any detailed
explanations as to how networks of MNs acquire their properties
in development and operate in the adult. Conceptual models such
as the associative learning theory of mirror neuron origins which
do not provide a proof of concept in the form of a computational
model, are unconvincing.
More than associations: An ideomotor
perspective on mirror neurons
doi:10.1017/S0140525X13002239
Marcel Brass and Paul S. Muhle-Karbe
Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, 9000 Ghent,
Belgium.
marcel.brass@ugent.be paulsimon.muhlekarbe@ugent.be
http://users.ugent.be/∼mbrass/Web-Site/Dr._Marcel_Brass.html
Abstract: In this commentary, we propose an extension of the associative
approach of mirror neurons, namely, ideomotor theory. Ideomotor theory
assumes that actions are controlled by anticipatory representations of their
sensory consequences. As we outline below, this extension is necessary to
clarify a number of empirical observations that are difficult to explain from
a purely associative perspective.
How often the battles of psychology have to be fought over again
each time with heavier armies and bigger trains…
— William James (1890, Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2, p. 523,
footnote)
AlthoughWilliam James wrote this sentence more than a hundred
years ago in his ingenious paragraph on ideomotor action, it could
have also have been coined in the discussion about the origin and
functional role of mirror neurons (MNs). One important contri-
bution of the associative learning account outlined in the target
article by Cook et al. has been to situate the finding of MNs in
the historical context of psychological theorizing on the relation-
ship of perception and action. Moreover, associative learning pro-
vides a powerful approach to explaining the ontogenesis of MNs
based on general learning principles. However, a purely associat-
ive account of mirror neurons falls short in explaining a number of
important findings regarding the modulation and control of the
mirror system. In this comment, we therefore outline an extension
of associative learning, namely, ideomotor theory that addresses
several of these problems.
While the origins of ideomotor theory can be traced back to
the beginning of the nineteenth century, the most prominent
proponent of ideomotor theory was William James (1890). In
its modern form (Greenwald 1970), ideomotor theory assumes,
just like associative learning, that learning promotes the associ-
ation of sensory and motor codes. However, ideomotor theory
states that in the course of learning, additional ideomotor rep-
resentations are formed that resemble anticipations of the to-
be-produced sensory consequences of an action (see our
Fig. 1, a–c, for a model of how ideomotor representations are
formed).
According to ideomotor theory, these representations primarily
serve a motor control function. We control our actions by antici-
pating their sensory consequences. Moreover, ideomotor theory
predicts a specific form of sensorimotor compatibility, namely,
ideomotor compatibility. A stimulus that resembles the antici-
pation of a sensory action-effect activates the corresponding ideo-
motor representation (see Fig. 1d). For example, the image of
another person opening their hand strongly overlaps with the rep-
resentation that is used to control the hand-opening movement.
Consequently, ideomotor-compatible stimuli can to some
degree bypass response selection by directly activating motor pro-
grams (Brass et al. 2001).
As ideomotor representations are conceived as neither uniquely
sensory nor motor, they should be localized in dedicated motor
control structures that are distinct from primary sensory or
motor areas. Such representations can be activated without
necessarily leading to overt behavior and are thus likely used for
motor planning and prediction (see also the commentary by
Keysers, Perrett, and Gazzola for the idea of mirror neurons
being involved in predictive coding). This property of ideomotor
theory is consistent with human brain imaging studies showing
an overlap of brain areas involved in action planning, movement
observation, and motor imagery (Grezes & Decety 2001).
Another important consequence of ideomotor compatibility
is that it can lead to self–other confusion. Because ideomotor-
compatible stimuli directly activate representations that are used
for motor control, confusion can arise between externally and
intentionally triggered motor representations. Accordingly, con-
trolling imitative behavior has been related to brain areas that
are involved in the sense of agency and self–other distinction,
and dissociated from brain areas involved in controlling interfer-
ence from overlearned stimulus–response associations (Brass
et al. 2003; 2005).
One crucial difference between ideomotor representations and
simple stimulus–response associations relates to the underlying
learning mechanisms. Ideomotor representations evolve from
learning the relationship between responses and subsequent
sensory effects (R-E learning). In contrast, classical associative
learning theories, although concerned with action-outcome con-
tingencies, primarily focus on learning the relationship of
responses to those stimuli that precede them (S-R learning).
Importantly, most experiments demonstrating that imitative
response tendencies can be easily reversed use S-R learning para-
digms rather than R-E learning paradigms (e.g., Catmur et al.
2007). From an ideomotor theory perspective, these findings
may reflect that rapid learning strengthens the corresponding
S-R associations to such a degree that they temporarily overrule
existing ideomotor representations, leading to an advantage
of ideomotor-incompatible over compatible mappings (Catmur
et al. 2007).
Another difference between associative learning and ideomotor
theory lies in their capacity to deal with specific forms of contex-
tual modulation. Cook et al. outline how associative learning can
explain the influence of contextual information on MN responses.
In human studies, however, it has been demonstrated that the
response of the mirror system is not only sensitive to contextual
cues but also to high-level beliefs about the intentionality of the
Figure 1 (Brass & Muhle-Karbe). Acquisition of an ideomotor
representation (adapted from Greenwald 1970). (a) A stimulus
(S) triggers a specific response (R) that leads to a sensory effect
(E). (b) After learning, the stimulus will activate an anticipation
(e) of the effect that precedes the response. (c) This anticipation
(e) becomes conditioned to the response and allows for control
of the response. (d) Priming by action observation: a stimulus
that resembles the effect of the action (Se) primes the
ideomotor representation (e) which activates the response.
Commentary/Cook et al.: Mirror neurons: From origin to function
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2014) 37:2 195
